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LABOR LAW-JURISDICTION OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD--NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD DENIED JURIS-
DICTION OVER LAY FACULTY OF PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS. Na-
tional Labor Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 99
S. Ct. 1313 (1979).
In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,' a divided2 United
States Supreme Court held that the National Labor Relations Act
3
does not authorize the National Labor Relations Board to exercise
jurisdiction over the lay faculty of church-operated schools that
teach both religious and secular subjects.4 In reaching its decision,
the Court asserted that it would not construe the Act in a manner
that could require a resolution of difficult and sensitive first amend-
ment questions in the absence of "an affirmative intention of the
Congress clearly expressed."5 Catholic Bishop represents an excep-
tion to the long line of Supreme Court decisions holding that the
statutory jurisdiction of the Board is coextensive with congressional
power to legislate under the commerce clause of the Constitution.6
The Catholic Bishop of Chicago, a corporation sole,7 operates
two secondary schools. The schools were termed "minor seminar-
ies" because admission was limited to boys with a positive desire to
be priests.' In 1970, however, the Archbishop broadened the admis-
sion policy to include all students "recommended by their parish
priest as having a potential for the priesthood or for Christian lead-
ership."9 The Board characterized the schools as essentially college
preparatory since only a small percentage of the students entered the
seminary.' 0 The academic curriculum and the extracurricular activi-
1. 99 S. Ct. 1313 (1979).
2. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Stewart,
Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices
White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 151-87 (1976).
4. 99 S. Ct. at 1322.
S. id at 1319.
6. See note 79 infra.
7. "A corporation sole is ... [a corporation] consisting of one person only, and his
successors in some particular station, who are incorporated by law in order to give them some
legal capacities and advantages, particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons
they could not have had." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 410 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
8. 99 S. Ct. at 1314.
9. Id at 1315.
10. 220 N.L.R.B. 359 (1975). The schools' literature for potential students describes the
one school as "a metropolitan, contemporary, college preparatory, seminary high school." Id
ties of the schools are substantially the same as other private and
public high schools with the exception of mandatory religious in-
struction. '
In 1974, an affiliate of the Illinois Education Association filed a
petition with the Board seeking representation of a unit composed of
the lay faculty of the two schools.' 2 After the representation hear-
ing, ' 3the Board held that its jurisdiction over the schools was not
precluded by the discretionary criteria it had established 4 nor by the
first amendment religion clauses.' 5 Following a Board-supervised
election, which the union won, the schools refused to collectively
bargain in order to obtain judicial review of the Board's representa-
tion decision.'6 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 7 de-
The literature emphasized the overwhelming number of graduates who matriculated at either
their first or second choice of colleges. Id Only 16% of the 1974 graduating class went on to
the seminary. Id
11. 99 S. Ct. at 1315.
12. Id Section 9(b) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976), requires the Board to deter-
mine the appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining. For a discussion of the
criteria employed by the Board, see ABA LABOR LAW SECTION, THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW 58-72 (Supp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW].
Since none of the parties in Catholic Bishop objected, the Board expressly excluded reli-
gious faculty from the bargaining unit. Cf. Seton Hill College, 201 N.L.R.B. 1026 (1973) (reli-
gious faculty excluded from bargaining unit of college faculty members). Unit determination
questions with respect to the inclusion of religious faculty in lay teachers units have been
considered. Compare Nazereth Regional High School v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1977)
(exclusion of religious faculty affirmed) with Niagara Univ. v. NLRB, 558 F.2d 1116 (2d Cir.
1977) and NLRB v. Saint Francis College, 562 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1977) (reversed Board deci-
sions that excluded religious faculty). See also Comment, The Bargaining Status ofReligious
Faculty at Church-Affliated Universities, 23 CATH. LAW. 33 (1977).
13. 220 N.L.R.B. 359 (1975). Representation hearings are provided for by § 9(c)(1) of
the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976). The NLRB usually requires that 30% of the employ-
ees express an interest in joining a union before it proceeds with a representation election. See
generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING 40 (1976).
14. The Board has never exercised its jurisdiction to the fullest extent. See NLRB v.
Pease Oil Co., 279 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1960), enforcing, 123 N.L.R.B. 660 (1959). Initially, the
Board required that a case have a significant impact on commerce before it would exercise its
jurisdiction. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 12, at 763. See also Polish Nat'l Alli-
ance, 42 N.L.R.B. 1375 (1942), enforced as modified, 136 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1943), afT'd, 322
U.S. 643 (1944); Christian Bd. of Publication, 13 N.L.R.B. 534 (1939), enforced, 113 F.2d 678
(8th Cir. 1940). In 1950, the Board expressly declared its policy of setting jurisdictional stan-
dards for specific categories of enterprises. Hollow Tree Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 635 (1950).
The Board's policy of discretionary jurisdiction has been explicitly approved by Congress
in NLRA § 14(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1976). The Supreme Court has also spoken ap-
provingly of the policy. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
15. 224 N.L.R.B. 1221, 1222 (1976). The Board rejected the employer's constitutional
contentions on the basis that,
(1) the purpose of the Act is to maintain and facilitate the free flow of commerce
through the stabilization of labor relations; (2) the provisions of the Act do not inter-
fere with religious beliefs; and (3) regulation of labor relations does not violate the
first amendment when it involves a minimal intrusion of religious conduct and is
necessary to obtain that objective.
Id
16. 99 S. Ct. at 1316. Section 10(f) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1976) provides as
follows:
Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole
or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in any United States
nied enforcement of the Board's collective bargaining order based on
the schools' first amendment claims.'" The court found that asser-
tion of jurisdiction would constitute both an impermissible involve-
ment in religious activity and a curtailment of the free exercise of
religion.'9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
whether the Act granted the Board jurisdiction over church-operated
schools and if so, whether the exercise of that jurisdiction violated
the first amendment.2 °
The Board first asserted jurisdiction over private nonprofit edu-
cational institutions in Cornell University. 21 In that case the Board
reversed its previous discretionary refusal of jurisdiction 22 because
of the "massive impact" of university operations on interstate
commerce. 23  Similarly, the Board extended coverage to non-
court of appeals in the circuit wherein the unfair labor practice in question was al-
leged to have been engaged in ....
A representation decision is not a final order of the Board. See, e.g., International Union
of Elec., Radio, & Mach. Workers, Local 806 v. NLRB, 434 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1970). An
employer seeking judicial review will refuse to bargain with the union in violation of § 8(a)(1)
and (5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) and (5) (1976), and wait for the general counsel to
issue a complaint and seek summary judgment, which is a final order. See Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 162 (1941); NLRA, §§ 9(d), 10(e), 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(d),
160(e) (1976). As explained by R. GORMAN, supra note 13, at 1I, "The object of this circui-
tious machinery is to deter dilatory challenges in the midst of representation cases which will
delay the conduct of an election and the prompt recording of employee preferences on collec-
tive bargaining . . . many instances render moot the challenges to the Board representation
findings."
17. The Seventh Circuit consolidated Catholic Bishop and Diocese of Fort Wayne-South
Bend, Inc., 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), because they posed the same constitutional ques-
tions. Diocese of Fort Wayne involved five traditional parochial high schools. The special
recommendation of a priest was not necessary for admission to the schools. The court deter-
mined that due to the result reached in these cases, it was not necessary to give significance to
the apparently greater religiosity of the Chicago schools. Id at 1113-14. The procedural his-
tory of Diocese of Fort Wayne is essentially the same as Chicago Bishop. The Board's unfair
labor practice decision in Diocese of Fort Wayne is reported at 224 N.L.R.B. 1226 (1976); the
representation decision, No. 25-RC-5984, was not published.
18. Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1122-23 (7th Cir. 1977).
19. Id
20. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 434 U.S. 1061 (1978).
21. 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).
22. Prior to 1970, the NLRB refused to assert jurisdiction over nonprofit educational
institutions. In the leading case of Trustees of Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. 424 (1951), the
Board declared that it would not serve the policies of the Act if the Board asserted "its jurisdic-
tion over a nonprofit, educational institution where the activities involved are noncommercial
in nature and intimately connected with the charitable purpose and educational activities of
the institution." Id. at 427. The Board, while basing its decision solely on the legislative his-
tory of the charitable hospitals exemption in the 1947 Labor Management Relations Act, ac-
knowledged the weakness of the legislative analysis:
Regardless of whether or not the Conference Report literally recites the Board's
practice prior to the amendment of the Act, it does indicate approval of and reliance
upon the Board's asserting jurisdiction over nonprofit organizations "only in excep-
tional circumstances and in connection with purely commercial activities of such or-
ganizations." Whether or not this language provides a mandate, it certainly provides
a guide.
Id See also Sherman & Black, The Labor Board and the Private Nonprofit Employer. 4 Criti-
cal examination of the Board's Worthy Cause Exemption, 83 HARV. L. REV. 323, 326-28 (1970).
23. The Board noted the increasing commercial activity at educational institutions that
are otherwise still primarily educational. The uncontested facts in Cornell stated that Syracuse
University, a party to the action, had an annual operating budget of $66 million, including out
profit24 and proprietary2l secondary schools with annual revenue
that met its jurisdictional requirements.
2 6
The issue of Board jurisdiction over church-operated schools
first arose in 1974. Two cases involving Jewish after-school educa-
tional institutions came before the Board.2' The instruction offered
by the associations was not entirely religious, but was "largely di-
rected to an understanding and appreciation of a particular reli-
gion."28 Sensitive to the first amendment issues involved, the Board
declined jurisdiction over the associations. The Board stated that it
did not intend to assert jurisdiction over primarily religious institu-
tions "whose educational endeavors are limited essentially to fur-
thering and nurturing their religious beliefs.
29
The Catholic parochial school cases, which also first arose in
of state purchases of $5 million. Similarly, the annual expenditures of Cornell University were
fixed at over $142 million. 183 N.L.R.B. at 329-30.
Another important factor in the Board's decision was the universities' desire for the Board
to assume jurisdiction. The New York State Labor Relations Act, N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 700-17
(McKinney 1977), was amended in 1969 to remove an exemption for nonprofit educational
institutions, 1968 N.Y. LAWS, ch. 890, § 4. Faced with regulation by the more restrictive state
labor relations act, the universities petitioned the NLRB to reverse Columbia University and
preempt the state action. 183 N.L.R.B. at 334. The Board's reversal of Columbia University
was greatly aided by the Supreme Court's observation in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183,
194-95 (1968), that "labor conditions in schools . . . can affect commerce . . . . Strikes and
work stoppages involving employees of schools. . . obviously interrupt and burden this flow
of goods across state lines." For a critical analysis of the Board's approach in Cornell, see
Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education.- The Failure of Policymaking Through Adjiudication,
21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 63 (1973) (Board's decision based on insufficient data). But see Finkin,
The NLRB in Higher Education, 5 U. TOL. L. REV. 608 (1974).
24. Judson School, 209 N.L.R.B. 677 (1974); Shattuck School, 189 N.L.R.B. 886 (1971).
25. Windsor School, Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. 991 (1972). "As no proper basis exists for estab-
lishing a different standard on the sole ground that an employer is operating for profit, we find
that the jurisdictional standard. . . for nonprofit secondary institutions is applicable to similar
for profit secondary schools." Id at 991.
26. The Board has traditionally adopted its jurisdictional standards for different em-
ployer categories on a case-by-case basis. See note 14 supra. After Cornell, however, the
Board exercised its rulemaking authority under § 6 of the NLRA, 28 U.S.C. § 156. 29 C.F.R.
§ 103.1 (1977) provides the following:
The Board wil I assert its jurisdiction in any proceeding arising under sections 8,
9, and 10 of the Act involving any private nonprofit college or university which has a
gross annual revenue from all sources (excluding only contributions which, because
of limitations by the grantor, are not available for use for operating expenses) of not
less than $1 million.
The Board has extended the jurisdictional standard to nonprofit and proprietary secondary
schools. See notes 24 and 25 supra. For a catalog of jurisdictional standards for other em-
ployer categories, see THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 12, at 776-79.
27. Association of Hebrew Teachers, 210 N.L.R.B. 1053 (1974); Board of Jewish Educ.,
210 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1974).
28. 210 N.L.R.B. at 1058. The school in Hebrew Teachers provided training for nursery
school classes and after-school classes for elementary and high school students. The curricu-
lum consisted of courses in Bible, comparative religion, Jewish music, history, literature, phi-
losophy, ethics, social studies, Hebrew language, Zionism, and current events relating to Israel
and Jews throughout the world. 1d at 1057.
29. 210 N.L.R.B. at 1037. The Board in Hebrew Teachers purported to base their denial
ofjurisdiction cn the atypical nature of the employer and the minimal impact of the schools on
interstate commerce. Id. at 1053. The school, however, had annual revenues in excess of $1
million. The Board's refusal of jurisdiction is more attributable to deferrence to the first
amendment than to the minimal impact on interstate commerce.
1974, presented the Board with a more extensive educational en-
deavor.3" The schools not only furthered the goals of Catholicism,
but also substituted for a public school education in its entirety. 3  In
Roman Catholic Archdioceses of Baltimore,32 the Board clarified its
jurisdictional test for religious schools: if the institution taught any
secular subjects the Board could exercise jurisdiction over it.33 This
religious "litmus test" has not gone unchallenged.34 The Board,
however, has consistently held that its exercise of jurisdiction over
Catholic parochial schools does not violate the religion clauses of the
first amendment.35
Although the schools in Catholic Bishop based their claim for
exemption from the Board's jurisdiction on the first amendment, the
Court avoided the constitutional issue by statutory construction. It is
a well-settled canon that "[a] statute must be construed if fairly pos-
sible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitu-
tional, but also grave doubts upon that score."' 36 The majority relied
on its earlier opinion in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
30. In 1972 there were over 18,000 elementary and secondary sectarian schools in the
United States teaching 5.2 million children. Over 12,000 of these schools, which employed
over 107,000 lay faculty members, were affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church. See PRES-
IDENT'S PANEL ON NONPUBLIC EDUCATION, FINAL REPORT 5-6, 15-19 (1972), reprinted in
Hearings on HR. 16141 and Other Proposals Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118-19, 127-31 (1972).
31. The Catholic schools are integrated into the total educational system of the state.
Kauper, Church and State. Cooperative Separatism, 60 MICH. L. REV. 1, 34, 36 (1961). The
schools stand as locum tenens with respect to the state for the purposes of compulsory educa-
tion statutes and further the state obligation to provide a well-educated population. See D.
GIANELLA, RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 79-83 (1969); Warner, NLRB Jurisdiction Over
Parochial Schools: Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 73 Nw. L. REV. 463, 467 (1978).
Implicit in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), and Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236
(1968), was the notion that private schools perform a dual role since assistance for purposes
not directly involved in religious instruction was upheld as serving a valid public interest.
32. 216 N.L.R.B. 249 (1975) (assertion ofjurisdiction over professional employees of five
private, religiously oriented high schools).
33. Id at 250. The Seventh Circuit saw the Board's test as essentially "a per se rule that
Catholic secondary schools will be subject to its statutory jurisdiction." 559 F.2d at 1118. One
commentator has contended that the test stated by the Board in Archbishop of Baltimore was
inconsistent with Board precedent in Board of Jewish Education and Hebrew Teachers, see note
28 supra. Serritella, The NLRB and Nonprofit Charitable, Educational, and Religious Institu-
tions, 21 CATH. LAW. 322, 330 (1975). For a critical analysis of the Board's test see R. CARR &
D. VAN EYCK, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COMES TO THE CAMPUS 283-93 (1973); Kahn, supra
note 23, at 84; Comment, The Free Exercise Clause, the NLRA, and Parochial Schools, 126 U.
PA. L. REV. 631 (1978); 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1321, 1336 (1978).
34. See, e.g., Cardinal Timothy Manning, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218 (1976); Roman Catholic
Archdiocese of Baltimore, 216 N.L.R.B. 249 (1975); Henry M. Hald High School Ass'n, 213
N.L.R.B. 415 (1974).
35. See note 15 supra.
36. Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933) (Cardozo, J.). Accord, Pernell
v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 365 (1974); International Ass'n of Mach. v. Street, 367 U.S.
740, 749 (1961); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). The
principle, however, has obvious limitations. See, e.g., Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 31
(1948), in which Chief Justice Vinson warned, "The canon of avoidance of constitutional
doubts must, like the 'plain meaning' rule, give way where its application would produce a
futile r sult, or an unreasonable result 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a
whole.'"
Marineros de Honduras3 7 as an example of the application of this
prudential policy to the Act. The Court in McCulloch required an
"affirmative intention of Congress clearly expressed,"38 before it
would conclude that the Act granted jurisdiction that gave rise to a
serious constitutional question.
Applying the McCulloch test, the Court inquired whether the
Board's exercise of jurisdiction presented a significant risk of first
amendment infringement.39  Analogizing to its recent decisions in-
volving governmental aid to parochial schools,4" the Court con-
cluded that "[g]ood intentions by government ...can surely no
more avoid entanglement with the religious mission of the school in
the setting of collective bargaining than in the well motivated legisla-
tive efforts consented to by the church-operated schools which we
found unacceptable."'" The entanglement doctrine to which the
Court referred was developed in Walz v. Tax Commission. 42 The
Walz Court stated that legislation that neither sponsored nor inhib-
ited religion could still violate the establishment clause if it called for
"official and continuing surveillance" of church activities by the gov-
ernment.43
Before a court can apply the entanglement analysis, a determi-
nation of the religious nature of the schools must be made in order to
assess the effect of the governmental intrusion. The Court of Ap-
peals in Catholic Bishop criticized the Board's "completely reli-
37. 372 U.S. 10 (1963). In McCulloch, the Board asserted jurisdiction over the Honduran
crew of a ship in United States waters under a Honduran flag. The ship was owned by a
wholly owned subsidiary of a United States corporation. The Board used a test in which it
balanced the foreign versus the United States contacts. The Court relied in part on its previous
decision in Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138 (1957), which stated that the
legislative history "inescapably describes the boundaries of the Act as including only work-
ingmen of our own country and its possessions." Id. at 144. The Court also noted that the
State Department and the Congress had policies of recognizing the flag of the ship as determi-
native of its nationality. Cognizant of the legislative history, the judicial precedent, and the
international implications, the Court construed the Act as not granting the Board jurisdiction
over foreign seamen.
38. 99 S. Ct. at 1319.
39. Id at 1320. By limiting the inquiry to whether there was a "significant risk" of in-
fringement, the Court avoided deciding the constitutional issues. Constitutional interpreta-
tion, however, may not be avoided since "tentative interpretations may be ventured in the very
process of stating what constitutional issues are being avoided; there may be temptation to
launch constitutional trial balloons and indulge in free floating constitutional dicta without the
restraints of fashioning constitutional law dispositive of the case." G. GUNTHER, CONSTITJ-
TIONAL LAW 1604 (9th ed. 1975).
The Court's inquiry into the entanglement doctrine did not go far enough. A constitu-
tional inquiry cannot stop at the point of entanglement because the "first amendment rights
must be balanced against secular considerations. In each case a different level of entanglement
may be tolerated." Warner, supra note 31, at 491. See also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672
(1971). The Court's inquiry focused on the degree of entanglement without considering the
congressional objectives or the effect of its decision on the lay teachers' rights.
40. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
41. 99 S. Ct. at 1319.
42. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
43. Id.
gious/religiously associated" test as being too simplistic." The court
substituted its own determination that the schools were "religiously
pervasive institutions," based not on the record, but on the findings
of the parochial aid cases, for the Board's determination.45 The
Supreme Court substantially followed the determination of the
Court of Appeals.46 State support of church-operated schools, how-
ever, presents issues quite distinct from those raised by the uniform
application of labor regulations to all employers.47 In determining
where to draw he line between church and state, the courts must
assess not only the "character and purpose" of the religious organi-
zation involved, but also the type of legislation to be applied and
"the resulting relationship between the state and religious author-
ity. "48
Faced with the Court's determination of the religious nature of
the schools, the Board argued that it could still avoid excessive en-
tanglement since it would only resolve factual issues unrelated to dif-
ferences of religious interpretation.49 Support for the Board's
position is found in Associated Press v. NLRB,5° which held that the
Board was capable of severing the nonconstitutional issues from
those arising under the first amendment in an unfair labor practice
proceeding.5' The dissent in Catholic Bishop felt that Associated
Press was indistinguishable in terms of the claim made by the em-
44. 559 F.2d at I 18. Accord, Note, The Religion Clauses and NLRB Jurisdiction Over
Parochial Schools, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 263, 297 (1978).
45. 559 F.2d at 1122. But cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 667 (1971) (White, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the majority had ignored the factual findings of the district court that
religious values did not necessarily affect the content of secular instruction).
46. 99 S. Ct. at 1319.
47. See K. Kryvoruka, The Church, The State and the National Labor Relations Act: Col-
lective Bargaining in the Parochial Schools, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33, 47-49 (1978); Note,
supra note 44, at 286.
48. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 851 (1978).
49. 99 S. Ct. at 1319. See K. Kryvoruka, supra note 47, at 36-37; note 61 infra.
50. 301 U.S. 103 (1937). Associated Press was an organization of newspapers for the
collection and distribution of news. Watson, an employee of Associated Press, had the duty of
determining the news value of items received and rewriting them for distribution. He was fired
for union activity and the Board asserted jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, in holding that the
freedom of the press was not abridged by the application of the Act, stated,
The business of the Associated Press is not immune from regulation because it is
an agency of the press. The publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from
the application of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the rights and
liberties of others. . . .The order of the Board in nowise circumscribes the full free-
dom and liberty of the petitioner to publish the news as it desires it published.
Id at 132-33.
51. A distinction between the secular and religious functions of parochial schools was the
premise on which some forms of state aid were upheld in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977). See Comment, Wolman v. Walter and the Continuing Debate over StateAid to Parochial
Schools, 63 IOWA L. REV. 543 (1977). For other examples of administrative separation of
religious and secular functions see Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (nonpublic col-
leges and universities); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (conscientious objector
exemption from selective service); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (tax exemptions
for church property).
ployer and the type of problem the Board was required to decide. 2
The opinion of the court failed to explain why the Associated Press
first amendment problem was any less significant than the problem
in Catholic Bishop. 53 The majority refused to decide the Board's con-
tention that it could avoid excessive entanglement since it would re-
quire a full constitutional inquiry. The majority did, however,
counter the contention with two examples that would require the
Board to go beyond resolving nonreligious factual issues. 4
The Board was created to implement the unfair labor practice
prcvisions of the Act.55 It is "an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
. . . to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organiza-
tion. "56 The current judicial interpretation of this section of the Act,
as summarized in NLRB v. Great Dane Travelers, Inc.,57 holds that
"if the adverse effect of the discriminatory conduct on employee
rights is 'comparatively slight,' an antiunion motivation must be
proved to sustain the charge f the employer has come forward with
evidence of legitimate and substantial business justifications for the
conduct."58 If the employer asserts a religious motive as a justifica-
tion for the discriminatory conduct, the Board would have to judge
52. 99 S. Ct. at 1327 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Associated Press asserted that it could not
be free to furnish impartial news unless it was equally free to determine the bias of its editorial
employees. 301 U.S. at 131.
53. 99 S. Ct. at 1327 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
54. See notes 60 and 64 infra. It has also been argued that the initial assertion of jurisdic-
tion in order to determine the appropriate bargaining unit constitutes an impermissible en-
croachment of the school's religious freedoms. See McCormick v. Hirsch, 460 F. Supp. 1337
(M.D. Pa. 1978) (preliminary injunction granted to restrain Board from initial assertion of
jurisdiction; same constitutional issues raised); Caulfield v. Hirsch, 410 F. Supp. 618 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (Board enjoined from asserting jurisdiction over unit of 273 elementary schools in the
diocese of Philadelphia). But see Grutka v. Barbour, 549 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1977) (encroachment
not sufficient to allow district court injunction).
55. "The Board is empowered ... to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair
labor practice (listed in section 8) affecting commerce." NLRA § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a)
(1976).
56. NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). Unfair labor practice cases provide
potentially greater constitutional dangers than representation hearings. The unfair labor prac-
tice proceeding is adversarial in terms of procedural and evidentiary practice. NLRB Unfair
Labor Practice Procedure, 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.39, 102.66 (1979); THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW,
supra note 12, at 828, 834-35. See NLRA § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976).
57. 388 U.S. 26 (1967) (unfair labor practice for an employer to grant vacation pay only
to those employees not participating in a strike).
58. Id at 34. The Court in Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S, 103, 132 (1937), stated
the following:
The [Aict permits a discharge for any reason other than union activity or agita-
tion for collective bargaining with employees. . . . The petitioner is at liberty, when-
ever occasion may arise, to exercise its undoubted right to sever his relationship for
any cause that seems to it proper save only as a punishment for, or discouragement
of, such activities as the [A]ct declares permissible.
See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 42-44 (1954); Janofsky, New Concepts in
Interference and Discrimination Under the NLRA." The Legacy of American Shipbuilding and
Great Dane Trailers, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 81 (1970); Comment, Employer Discrimination Under
Section 8(a)(3), 5 U. TOL. L. REV. 722 (1974); 48 B.U.L. REV. 142 (1968).
whether the motive is "legitimate and substantial." 9 The majority
in Catholic Bishop felt that the very process of the inquiry may im-
pinge on first amendment rights.6" The Board could avoid the deter-
mination of religious doctrine only by taking all religious claims at
face value. The Court of Appeals, however, rejected this practice of
accommodation as an infraction of the establishment clause.6
The Act requires both parties to engage in good faith bargaining
59. 388 U.S. at 34. "[Tlhe burden is upon the employer to establish that he was moti-
vated by legitimate objectives since proof of motivation is most accessible to him." Id
For a critical analysis of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the role of motive in unfair
labor practices see Christensen & Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor
Practices.- The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 YALE L.J. 1269 (1968). The authors
argue that the role of motive has been warped from its original statutory design as evidence of
discrimination to the ostensibly controlling element. Id
60. 99 S. Ct. at 1320. The Board's enforcement proceedings can be analogized to civil
court proceedings to adjudicate church property disputes since the Board functions as a judi-
cial tribunal in certain matters under the Act. The Court in Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969), established the doc-
trine of "marginal judicial involvement."
Civil Courts do not inhibit free exercise of religion merely by opening their
doors to disputes involving church property. And there are neutral principles of law,
developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without "establish-
ing" churches to which property is awarded . [.. T]he First Amendment enjoins the
employmemt of organs of government for essentially religious purposes ...
Id at 449.
Thus, the Supreme Court did not bar civil courts from hearing ecclesiastical property
disputes, but only barred such suits from being decided on ecclesiastical grounds. Id at 449-
52. In a later case involving an intrachurch property dispute, the Supreme Court abandoned
the "marginal judicial involvement" doctrine. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. 696 (1976), held that civil courts must accept the decisions of religious authorities on
matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law. Id at
713. The Milivojevich principle prohibits the Board from deciding the merits of the employer's
religious defense. See Sampen, Civil Courts, Church Property, and Neutral Principles- .4 Dis-
senting View, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 543. It appears, however, that an inquiry into the good faith of
the religious defense would be permissible. Comment, supra note 33, at 655. See United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 (1944).
61. 559 F.2d at 1129. Judge Pell, writing for the majority of the court, stated,
A "reasonable accommodation" by the Board "to the religious purposes of the
school" on the presentation of a doctrinal issue in an unfair labor practice case would
implicitly appear to us to involve the necessity of explanation and analysis, and prob-
ably verification and justification, of the doctrinal precept involved, all of which
would itself erode the protective wall afforded by the constitutional right.
Id
Accommodation means an adjustment or an adaption or a compromise and settlement
involving a first amendment right. Id See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 14-
4 to 14-5 at 819-26 (1978), for a discussion of the meaning of accommodation:
'The fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that government neither
engage in nor compel religious practices, that it effect no favoritism among sects or
between religion and nonreligion, and that it work deterrence of no religious belief.'
This approach does, of course, entail a notion of accommodation-recognizing that
there are necessary relationships between government and religion; that government
cannot be indifferent to religion in American life; and that, far from being hostile or
even truly indifferent, it may, and sometimes must, accommodate its institutions and
programs to the religious interest of the people.
Id at 822 (quoting Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963)). Cf. Serbian
E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 734 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (acceptance of religious tribunal decisions in property dispute, without inquiry created
greater establishment problems than the free exercise concerns avoided). But cf. Cummins v.
Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975) (an EEOC regulation, under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, requiring accommodation of employees did not violate establishment
clause).
over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment."62  The Board has the power to decide what are terms and
conditions of employment and, therefore, mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining. The majority found an implication of "sensitive issues" if
the school refused to bargain over a mandatory subject it considered
a matter of religious policy.6" The Board would be placed in the
position of deciding which issues are religious enough to warrant ex-
emption from the bargaining requirement. The Board would be re-
quired to evaluate the good faith of the school's refusal to bargain
and whether the religious doctrine the school was asserting actually
applied to the subject under consideration.' It has been argued that
the governmental intrusion is minimal since the Board is powerless
to insist upon an agreement or compromise on any proposal.65 Even
though the substantive terms are left to the bargaining parties, the
coercive effect of the Board's determination remains. The use of eco-
nomic force through a strike is permissible to win concessions on
mandatory subjects of bargaining if an agreement cannot be
reached.
66
The Court found that the Board's exercise of jurisdiction over
church-operated schools created a sufficient risk of first amendment
infringement to implement the McCulloch test.67 The majority ex-
62. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976) defines "bargain collectively" as "the per-
formance of the mutual obligation. . . to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment . . . but such
obligation dues not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the king of a conces-
sion."
63. 99 S. Ct. at 1320. The Board has not determined what are "terms and conditions" of
employment in teacher negotiations. Id. See generally, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra
note 12, at 379-439. One of the main concerns is the infringement on the administrative auton-
omy of the employer. "Once collective bargaining is established it is very difficult to restrict
the scope of bargaining to a narrow range of employment issues. Faculty bargaining in partic-
ular, has the potential of touching virtually every governance issue that is subject to major
dispute." CAMPUS EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 4 (T. Tice ed. 1976). See Brown, Collective Bar-
gaining In Higher Education, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1067, 1075 (1969) (obligation to bargain results
in "transmutation of academic policy into employment terms").
64. See notes 60 and 61 supra. The obligation of good faith bargaining has been held not
to conflict with any free exercise value. Cap Santa Vue, Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (Act sufficiently invested with public interest to require good faith bargaining from em-
ployer whose religious beliefs preclude recognition of union).
65. See note 62 supra. See Kryvoruka, supra note 47, at 54-55, who argues that the
purpose of the Act is to encourage collective bargaining with a minimum of government in-
volvement. Only when the bargaining process breaks down does the Board intervene. Even
then, the actual substantive terms are left to the parties. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99
(1970); Cap Santa Vue, Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
66. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960). Even though the em-
ployees engaged in unprotected harassment for which they could have been fired, the Supreme
Court held that their conduct did not constitute a refusal to bargain in good faith as required
by 8(b)(3) of the NLRA. Noting that Congress did not intend the NLRB to regulate the sub-
stantive terms of labor agreements, the Court stated, "[I1f the Board could regulate the choice
of economic weapons that may be used as part of collective bargaining, it would be in a posi-
tion to exercise considerable influence upon the substantive terms on which the parties con-
tract." Id at 490. See NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); Murphy, Impasse
and the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. I (1977); Comment, supra note 33.
67. "We see no escape from conflicts flowing from the Board's exercise of jurisdiction
amined the Act and its legislative history in search of the express
intention of Congress to include church-operated schools under its
coverage. Failing to find any mention of the subject in the Act or the
congressional reports, the majority concluded that Congress "simply
gave no consideration to church-operated schools."68 The Board,
therefore, failed to justify its assertion of jurisdiction under the Mc-
Culloch test and the Court avoided the constitutional issue.6 9
Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion stated that McCulloch
was neither a relevant precedent nor an accurate expression of the
well-settled canon of construction the majority purported to use.7 °
The history of the Act and a prior Supreme Court case7' affirma-
tively indicated that Congress did not intend to cover the foreign
seamen in McCulloch. Only when confronted with a clear conflict
between the broad coverage of the Act and part of its legislative his-
tory did the Court require an affirmative showing of congressional
intent.72 Noting the absence of any contrary legislative history or
precedent with respect to jurisdiction over church-operated schools,
the dissent felt that the application of the McCulloch test was inap-
propriate.73 Justice Brennan asserted that the well-settled canon of
construction stated by the majority is limited to constructions that
are "fairly possible" and "reasonable. 74 These requirements are
considerably less severe than the "affirmative intention clearly ex-
pressed" test of McCulloch. The McCulloch standard is unrealistic
in light of the type of statute involved. Congress gave the Board
power to order elections when "a question of representation affecting
commerce exists' 75 and "to prevent any person from engaging in any
unfair labor practice affecting commerce. '76  Given the legislative
process, "explicit expressions of congressional intent in such broadly
over teachers in church-operated schools and the consequent serious first amendment ques-
tions that would follow." 99 S. Ct. at 1320.
68. Id at 1321. But see Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395-
97 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring), in which the Justice argued against the use of legislative
history in interpreting the acts of Congress.
Resort to legislative history is only justified where the face of the Act is inescap-
ably ambiguous. . . . It is the business of Congress to sum up its own debates in its
legislation. Moreover, it is only the words of the bill that have presidential ap-
proval. . . . It is not to be supposed that, in signing a bill, the President endorses the
whole Congressional Record.
1d at 395-96.
69. 99 S. Ct. at 1322.
70. Id at 1323.
71. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138 (1957). See note 37 supra.
72. See note 37 
supra.
73. The Supreme Court has made statements concerning the proper interpretation of the
Act. The Act "purports to reach only what may be deemed to burden or obstruct ... com-
merce and, thus qualified, it must be construed as contemplating the exercise of control within
constitutional bounds. . . . It is the effect on commerce, not the source of the injury, which is
the criteria." NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1937).
74. 99 S. Ct. at 1324. See note 36 supra.
75. NLRA § 9(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976).
76. NLRA § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
inclusive statutes are not commonplace."77
The dissent would construe the Act to cover all employers
whose businesses "affect commerce" and who are not expressly ex-
empted in the definitional section.78 This approach is consistent with
a long line of Supreme Court decisions that "Congress intended to
and did vest in the Board the fullest jurisdictional breadth constitu-
tionally permissible under the Commerce Clause."7 9 It has been
questioned whether this interpretation sweeps too broadly since the
commerce clause was not considered to be as expansive at the time
of the Act's passage as it is today.8" Congress, however, foresaw the
possibility of changes in the judicial interpretations of its power.
The Senate Report on the Act stated, "While this bill of course does
not intend to go beyond the constitutional power of Congress, as that
power may be marked out by the courts, it seeks the full limit of that
power in preventing . . . unfair labor practices."'"
The Court in Catholic Bishop exceeded its proper judicial role.
It has in effect added an exception to the eight already in the Act
without any "evidence that Congress did intend an exception it
never stated."82 It is significant that Congress considered and re-
jected an amendment that would have had the same affect as the
77. 99 S. Ct. at 1323. The Congress sought to create a broad solution to the problem of
strikes and other industrial unrest that burdened commerce. "It is declared to be the policy of
the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of
commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by en-
couraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining." NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1976).
78. 99 S. Ct. at 1324. Section 2(2) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.§ 152(2) (1976) defines "em-
ployer" as including,
any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not
include the United States or any wholly owned government corporation, or any Fed-
eral Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any person subject
to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or any labor organization
(other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer
or agent of such labor organization.
"[Tihe broad language of the Act's definitions.., leaves no doubt that its applicability is
to be determined broadly, in doubtful situations, by underlying economic facts." NLRB v.
Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 129 (1944).
79. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963) (per curiam) (emphasis in
original). See, e.g., Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 (1944) (nonprofit fraternal
benefit society providing insurance to its members); NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1938)
(employer whose own business involved no interstate commerce, but processed materials
shipped to and from employer by foreign customers); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937) (single, local plant of vertically integrated steel corporation).
80. Comment, supra note 33, at 638. Compare Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936) with Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
81. S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1935), reprinted in 2NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 2318-19 (1935). See also STATU-
TORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: LABOR ORGANIZATION (F. Koretz ed. 1970).
82. 99 S. Ct. at 1327 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In a case involving a question of Board
jurisdiction over private nonprofit institutions of higher learning, the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit asserted, "[W]hile there are good arguments against permitting faculty members
to bargain collectively, the converse is not so unthinkable as to justify our writing into the Act
a jurisdictional exclusion where none now exists." NLRB v. Wentworth Inst., 515 F.2d 550,
556 (lst Cir. 1975).
majority's construction of the Act. The 1947 House version of the
Labor Management Relations Act specifically exempted nonprofit,
religious, or educational employers.83 After conferring with the Sen-
ate, however, the exemption was limited to nonprofit hospitals and
passed in that form.
84
Since the passage of the Act in 1935, the Court has consistently
interpreted the Board's jurisdiction as being coextensive with the
commerce clause. By creating an exception to this interpretation
based on statutory construction, 85 the Court has avoided the consti-
tutional questions involved, but has done so at the expense of consid-
erable uncertainty. An exception for church-operated schools
creates a potential establishment question of its own. This potential
has been reinforced by the Board's narrow interpretation of Catholic
Bishop. The Board has made a distinction between church-operated
schools and schools that, although religiously oriented, are operated
by an independent board of directors. 86 Had the Court denied the
Board jurisdiction based on the first amendment, such tenuous dis-
83. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(2) (1974), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 1947 161-62 (1948). The bill specifi-
cally stated that the "term 'employer' ... shall not include . . . any corporation, community
chest, fund, or foundation organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scien-
tific, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals."
84. The Conference Report for the 1947 Amendments to the Act stated that "only in
exceptional circumstances and in connection with purely commercial activities of such organi-
zations have any of the activities of such organizations or of their employees been considered
as affecting commerce so as to bring them within the scope of the National Labor Relations
Act." H.R. REP. No. 51,80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1947), reprinted in [1947] U.S. CODE CONG.
SERV. 1135, 1137. But see Sherman & Black, supra note 22, at 1331-37 (contending that the
Board's actual policy before 1947 did not support the Conference Agreement's conclusion that
jurisdiction was asserted over nonprofit employers only in "exceptional circumstances").
The Congress eliminated the nonprofit hospital exemption in 1974. The Senate consid-
ered and rejected an amendment by Senator Ervin that would have created an exception for
hospitals operated by religious organizations. 120 CONG. REC. 12950, 12968 (1974). Senator
Cranston, noting the existing national policy of holding religiously affiliated institutions to the
same standards as their nonsectarian counterparts, stated:
[o]ne can truly say that this Nation owes religious groups throughout the country
a debt of gratitude for these many years of selfless social service. But this debt cannot
and must not, include a subsidy from the workers themselves, which in effect is what
this amendment would provide by denying them rights under the NLRA.
120 CONG. REC. 12957 (1974).
85. For an interesting comparison, see United Steel Workers of America v. Weber, 99 S.
Ct. 2721 (1979), in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan switch roles. Justice Bren-
nan, speaking for the majority, interpreted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), as not condemning all private affirmative action plans. Chief
Justice Burger, in dissent, criticized the majority's approach as amendment by construction,
utilizing many of Justice Brennan's arguments in Catholic Bishop.
86. Diocese of Brooklyn, 101 L.R.R.M. 1436 (1979) (3-1 decision). The case involved
Bishop Ford Central Catholic High School, which had previously been operated by the Bishop
of Brooklyn. In 1976, the Bishop transferred operation of the school to an independent board
of the Fathers' Guild and the Mothers' Guild. The school remained religiously-oriented with
a distinctly sectarian mission. The Board held that since it was governed by an independent
board, the school was not church-operated and therefore not within the Supreme Court hold-
ing in Catholic Bishop. The Board, however, has withdrawn its jurisdiction over schools di-
rectly operated by the Church. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 102 L.R.R.M. 1126 (1979);
Gordon Technical High School, 101 L.R.R.M. 1592 (1979).
[Casenote by Dean A. Crabtree]
tinctions would have been obviated. Since the Court relied only on
the Act and not the first amendment, it has also created the possibil-
ity of state labor boards asserting jurisdiction over the schools. The
Catholic Bishop holding has opened the door to further attack on the
Board's jurisdiction. Employers will need only show a "significant
risk" of constitutional infringement to involve the courts in the dubi-
ous chore of interpreting legislative history.
TORTS-HUSBAND AND WIFE-NEBRASKA ABROGATES INTER-
SPOUSAL TORT IMMUNITY. Imig v. March, _ Neb. _, 279
N.W.2d 382 (1979).
In Imig v. March,' the Supreme Court of Nebraska abolished
the doctrine of interspousal immunity for all tort claims arising in
the State. This decision means that no longer will a marital relation
between tortfeasor and victim be grounds for dismissal of an other-
wise meritorious claim. The Imig decision places Nebraska in the
emerging majority of states that have either partially or fully abro-
gated the interspousal tort immunity doctrine.2
On February 26, 1977, Lois Schaap was flying in a private plane
piloted by her husband Otto. He allegedly caused the plane to make
several loops and rolls. Unable to pull out of the recovery dive, the
plane crashed and burned, killing both occupants.' A suit in tort was
brought by the personal representative of Mrs. Schaap against the
estate of Otto Schaap, charging his negligence and gross negligence
as the proximate cause of his wife's death.4 Defendant filed a de-
murrer to the charges, based on firmly established Nebraska com-
mon law that held husband and wife immune from tort liability for
injury or death to the other spouse during marriage.5 The trial court
sustained the demurrer, and plaintiff appealed.6
The issue presented on appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court
was whether the interspousal tort immunity doctrine should be abro-
gated in an action for wrongful death. Taking into account Ne-
braska's wrongful death statute7 that establishes a clear cause of
1. _ Neb. _, 279 N.W.2d 382 (1979).
2. See notes 92-98 and accompanying text infra.
3. See Brief for Appellant at 7, Imig v. March, _ Neb. _ 279 N.W.2d 382 (1979).
4. These allegations were not considered at trial since the court first had to rule on the
procedural defense of interspousal tort immunity raised by decedent-husband's representative.
The ultimate disposition by the Nebraska Supreme Court was to reverse dismissal and remand
the case for trial on the merits. __ Neb. at _, 279 N.W.2d at 387.
5. The common-law doctrine of interspousal tort immunity was first given judicial rec-
ognition in Nebraska in Emerson v. Western Seed & Irrigation Co., 116 Neb. 180, 216 N.W.
297 (1927). That case held that statutes granting married women legal rights extended to prop-
erty and contract, but not to the right of recovery against a spouse for personal injury. See
notes 38-43 and accompanying text infra.
6. __ Neb. at _, 279 N.W.2d at 383. Petitioner contended that since the doctrine was of
common law and not statutory origin, the Nebraska Supreme Court had the power to modify
it.
7. The Act provides the following:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or
default of any person, company or corporation, and the act, neglect, or default is such
action on the facts of the case, a provision in the State Constitution,8
for open courts, absence of contrary legislation,9 and a growing body
of case law in other states supporting abrogation,' ° the court over-
ruled the interspousal immunity doctrine. Significantly, the holding
went beyond the pleadings and abolished the defense for all inter-
spousal tort actions." Finding historical justifications for inter-
spousal iunity no longer applicable to contemporary needs, the court
enunciated a new open-door policy in which tort claims would be
litigated on the merits, notwithstanding marital status.
Interspousal tort immunity has its roots in the common-law
doctrine of the legal identity of husband and wife. 2 At common law
when a woman married all of her legal rights and claims were
merged into those of her husband.' 3 She had no capacity to sue or
be sued in her own name. When she did have a cause of action, it
could be brought in her husband's name only or he could be joined
as plaintiff. 4 Likewise, if the wife had the capacity to commit a tort
during marriage, she could not be sued without her husband being
joined as defendant. 15 Because a woman's legal identity was sus-
pended during coverture, 6 an interspousal tort suit was a procedural
as would, f death had not ensued, have entitled theparty inyured to maintain an action
and recover damages in respect thereof then and in every such case, the person who,
or company or corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued,
shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person
injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as
amount in law to felony.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-809 (1975) (emphasis added).
8. "All courts shall be open, and every person, for any injury done him in his lands,
goods, person or reputation, shall have a remedy by due course of law, and justice adminis-
tered without denial or delay." NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
9. Nebraska's married women's statute reads in part, "A woman may while married sue
and be sued, in the same manner as if she were unmarried." NEa. REV. STAT. § 25-305 (1975).
10. See, e.g., Russell v. Cox, 65 Idaho 534, 148 P.2d 221 (1944); Welch v. Davis, 410 Ill.
130, 101 N.E.2d 547 (1951);'Herget Nat'l Bank of Pekin v. Berardi, 31 111. App. 3d 689, 335
N.E.2d 39 (1975); In re Estate of Pickens, 255 Ind. 119, 263 N.E.2d 151 (1970); Robinson's
Adm'r v. Robinson, 188 Ky. 49, 220 S.W. 1074 (1920); Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 138
N.W.2d 343 (1965); Poepping v. Lindemann, 268 Minn. 30, 127 N.W.2d 512 (1964); Deposit
Guar. Bank & Trust Co. v. Nelson, 212 Miss. 335, 54 So. 2d 476 (1951); Merenoffv. Merenoff,
76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951 (1978); Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 184 A. 663 (1936);
Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977).
11. The court declared, "It would appear that in light of the so-called 'married woman's
act' the historical basis for interspousal immunity no longer exists. If this be a 'startling inno-
vation,' so be it." Imig v. March, _ Neb. __ 279 N.W.2d 382, 385 (1979). See notes 77-79
and accompanying text infra for discussion of the scope of the court's holding.
12. See I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *443 for a statement on the legal conse-
quences of marriage at common law. See also McCurdy, Personal In/ury Torts Between
Spouses, 4 VILL. L. REV. 303, 303-07 (1959); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic
Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030, 1031-35 (1930); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F,
Comments b and c at 424-25 (1979).
13. See Haskins, The Estate by Marital Right, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 345 (1949) for commen-
tary on property rights at common law.
14. Rogers v. Smith, 17 Ind. 323 (1861); Laughlin v. Eaton, 54 Me. 156 (1866).
15. Bishop v. Readsboro Chair Mfg. Co., 85 Vt. 141, 81 A. 454 (1911).
16. A married woman only had these disabilities at law and not in equity. At Chancery,
property and contract rights of the married woman have always been recognized. W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 154 n.18 (3d ed. G. Chase 1900).
impossibility.
By the time Imig v. March'7 was decided, Nebraska, like all
other states, had enacted a married women's statute.' 8 The law re-
moved many of the wife's common-law disabilities, particularly in
the property and contract domains.' 9 Underlying statutory differ-
ences20 and varying judicial interpretations of the Act, was the basic
premise that the married woman was to regain legal rights and re-
sponsibilities lost at marriage and be placed on a legal footing equal
to her husband.2 1 This statutory grant established a new dimension
in the legal relation between husband and wife, but there was little
consistency among courts22 concerning the scope and nature of this
change. Although passage of married women's statutes endowed the
husband with no new rights per se, suits by the husband against the
wife following her recognition as a separate legal entity were not un-
common.23 Actions in ejectment,24 suits to collect rent,25 and trover
proceedings 26 were litigated between spouses. In regard to personal
tort actions, however, the raising of the legal status of the wife to a
position of equality with her husband ironically caused the great lag
in the evolution of interspousal tort rights. Since the legal unity the-
ory foreclosed the right of the husband to sue his wife for personal
injury,27 the legal capacity granted to women "to sue and be sued"
28
was interpreted as expanding rights only in regard to property and
17. _ Neb. _ 279 N.W.2d 382 (1979).
18. Married women's statutes began appearing in 1844 in the United States, see, e.g., ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 19, §§ 161-65 (1964), and developed steadily through the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Nebraska's married women's statute, see note 9 supra, was enacted in 1893
and first interpreted in Skinner v. Skinner, 38 Neb. 756, 57 N.W. 534 (1894). The court in
Skinner held that a wife as landlord could maintain an action against the tenant for the value
of unpaid rents, notwithstanding the fact that the tenant was her husband.
19. For the early cases interpreting Nebraska's married women's statute as extending
rights only in areas of property and contract, see Skinner v. Skinner, 38 Neb. 756, 57 N.W. 534
(1894); Godfrey v. Megahan, 38 Neb. 748, 57 N.W. 284 (1894); May v. May, 9 Neb. 16, 2 N.W.
221 (1879).
20. For an excellent statutory classification scheme, see McCurdy, 43 HARV. L. REV.
1030, supra note 12, at 1037.
2 1. One of the weakest justifications for denying the right of interspousal tort claims of
passage of the married women's statutes is the argument that since under the Act a married
woman is to have the same rights as an unmarried woman then she should not be permitted to
bring an action against her husband, because an unmarried woman has no husband to sue.
Skinner v. Skinner, 38 Neb. 756, 57 N.W. 534 (1894), construed in, Imig v. March, _ Neb.__
279 N.W.2d 382, 384 (1979).
22. Compare Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889 (1914), with Emerson v. Western
Seed & Irrigation Co., 116 Neb. 180, 216 N.W. 297 (1927).
23. See generally McCurdy, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030, supra note 12, at 1039-40.
24. Crater v. Crater, 118 Ind. 521, 21 N.E. 290 (1889); McKendry v. Fessler, 131 Pa. 24,
18 A. 1078 (1890).
25. Skinner v. Skinner, 38 Neb. 756, 57 N.W. 534 (1894).
26. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 64 Minn. 381, 67 N.W. 206 (1896).
27. See, e.g., Barnett v. Harshbarger, 105 Ind. 410, 5 N.E. 718 (1885); Rogers v. Rogers,
265 Mo. 200, 177 S.W. 382 (1915).
28. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-305 (1975), partially quoted at note 9 supra.
contract, unless legislation specifically stated otherwise.29 While it
was the wife who was most often adversely affected by the immunity
from tort claims, it was nonetheless equally applicable to the hus-
band,3" and as one court stated, "Both spouses have the same disa-
bility and the equality is complete."'" This justification has strongly
dominated judicial thinking to the great expense of affording a rem-
edy to deserving plaintiffs.32
Even when the married women's act could be interpreted to per-
mit an interspousal suit for a tort claim, courts found a veritable
array of policy arguments that easily perpetuated the immunity doc-
trine.3 3 In 1910 the United States Supreme Court rendered a deci-
sion in the case of Thompson v. Thompson,34 on an appeal from the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. At issue was whether
a provision of the Code of the District of Columbia giving married
women the right "to sue separately for the recovery, security, or pro-
tection of their property, and for torts committed against them, as
fully and freely as if they were unmarried" 35 meant that a wife could
bring a tort suit against her husband, in this case for assault and
battery. The Court rested its denial of the wife's right to sue on hy-
pothesized "legislative intent" 36 in drafting the statute and on the
29. The following are the only examples of legislation specifically passed to regulate in-
terspousal tort liability:
Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1953) prohibits all tort suits
between spouses. It was passed following the Illinois Supreme Court decision in Brandt v.
Keller, 413 I11. 503, 109 N.E.2d 729 (1952), holding a husband liable to wife for negligent
injury.
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1 (Supp. 1953) gives a right of action in tort to
husband and wife in interspousal suits.
Wisconsin: WIs. STAT. § 246.075 (1931) expressly states that a husband has the right to
bring a personal injury action against his wife. A wife's right to bring a similar action against
her husband had been established earlier by the courts.New York: 1937 N.Y. LAWS, ch. 669 gives a husband or wife a right of action against the
other spouse for personal and property injuries.
30. Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 P. 219 (1909); Hanna v. Hanna, 143 Ind. App. 521,
241 N.E.2d 376 (1968), overruled by, In re Pickens, 255 Ind. 119, 263 N.E.2d 151 (1970);
Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1959).
31. Emerson v. Western Seed & Irrigation Co., 116 Neb. 180, _ 216 N.W. 297, 299
(1927). But see Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938), for a different view
of the equality of disability problem; Oklahoma was one of the first states to permit inter-
spousal suits. Id at _ 87 P.2d at 662.
32. The following decisions were based on the premise that the married women's statutes
impacted the interspousal immunity doctrine: Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95 (Alaska 1963);
Leach v. Leach, 227 Ark. 599, 300 S.W.2d 15 (1957); Packenham v. Miltimore, 89 Ill. App. 2d
452, 232 N.E.2d 42 (1967); Foster v. Foster, 264 N.C. 694, 142 S.E.2d 638 (1965); Lucas v.
Phillips, 205 Tenn. 444, 326 S.W.2d 905 (1957). Contra, Fisher v. Toler, 194 Kan. 701, 401 P.2d
1012 (1965); Ennis v. Donovan, 222 Md. 536, 161 A.2d 698 (1960), overruled by, Lusby v.
Lusby, _ Md. _ 390 A.2d 77 (1978); Long v. Landy, 35 N.J. 44, 171 A.2d 1 (1961).
33. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 862-64 (4th ed. 1971);
McCurdy, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030, supra note 12, at 1050-54.
34. 218 U.S. 611 (1910).
35. Id at 615-16.
36. "The statute was not intended to give a right of action as against the husband, but to
allow the wife in her own name, to maintain actions of tort which at common law must be
brought in the joint names of herself and husband." Id at 617.
traditional policy concerns of promoting domestic harmony, fear of
spawning trivial litigation between spouses, and the presumption
that an adequate remedy for assault and battery could be found
through criminal or divorce proceedings.37
Emerson v. Western Seed and Irrigation Co. 38 established the in-
terspousal tort immunity doctrine in Nebraska in 1927. Relying on
policy considerations akin to those enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Thompson, the Nebraska Supreme Court ruled that interspousal
liability would create procedural difficulties in litigating husband-
wife suits,39 dangerously disrupt the secrecy and intimacy of the
marital relation,4" create a risk of fraud and collusion,4' open the
courts to a floodgate of litigation,42 and be a "startling innovation."43
Such changes, the court stated, should come from the legislature,"
not the judiciary. The state of the law in Nebraska in regard to in-
terspousal immunity remained unchanged for over half a century
between Emerson and Imig v. March. 45
While interspousal tort immunity has fallen into unanimous dis-
repute within the legal community,46 it is still viable in approxi-
37. Although the Supreme Court's decision reflected the majority view in the country
and did much to impede later efforts to modify the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity, it is
Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion that is represented in the contemporary trend toward abro-
gation. Justice Harlan advocated strict interpretation of statutory language without reliance on
hypothesized legislative intent. Id at 619-24. Compare Justice Harlan's approach with the
majority opinion in Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 138 N.W.2d 343 (1965), which suggests
that when a court abrogates the doctrine, the decision should be based on a flat rejection of
common-law tradition rather than statutory interpretation.
38. 116 Neb. 180, 216 N.W. 297 (1927). In Emerson, the court barred a wife from collect-
ing damages from her husband's employer for injuries resulting from the husband's negligence
in driving the employer's automobile in the course of business. The court reasoned that al-
lowing a wife to recover against a third party for the negligence of her husband would be
"countenancing an encircling movement where a frontal attack upon the husband is inhib-
ited." Id at 299.
39. The court never clarified what "procedural difficulties" in interspousal tort suits
make these suits any more problematic to litigate than interspousal property and contract suits.
40. Contra, W. PROSSER, supra note 33, at 863.
41. See, e.g., Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 P. 219 (1909); Hunter v. Livingston, 125
Ind. App. 422, 123 N.E.2d 912 (1955); Kircher v. Kircher, 288 Mich. 669, 286 N.W. 120 (1939);
Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963). Contra, Goller v. White, 20
Wis. 2d 402, 410, 122 N.W.2d 193, 196 (1963).
42. For the more widely accepted view that courts do not become cluttered with trivial
marital claims see Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962); Taylor
v. Patten, 2 Utah 2d 404, _._, 275 P.2d 696, 699 (1954); Goode v. Martinis, 58 Wash. 2d 229,
234, 361 P.2d 941, 944 (1961). See generally, W. PROSSER,, supra note 33, at 864.
43. Emerson v. Western Seed & Irrigation Co., 116 Neb. 180, _, 216 N.W. 297, 298
(1927). The court's refusal to redefine spousal rights and obligations in light of married wo-
men's statutes and contemporary needs is reflected in this type of justification for maintaining
the immunity doctrine. See generally notes 52-53 and accompanying text infra.
44. Accord, Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Burns v. Burns, I I I Ariz. 178,
526 P.2d 717 (1974); DiGirolamo v. Apanavage, 454 Pa. 557, 312 A,2d 382 (1973); Schultz v.
Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 118 P. 629 (1911). But see Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500
P.2d 771 (1972).
45. Between 1927 and 1979 the doctrine was not challenged in the Nebraska Supreme
Court. Interspousal tort immunity was the rule in the state without exception until the Imig
decision was rendered.
46. This writer has yet to find an article or commentary that favors maintaining the de-
mately one-half of American jurisdictions.47 The survival of the
doctrine48 is best explained by focusing on two basic premises that
underlie its judicial interpretation: (1) the court's traditionally pro-
tective attitude toward the family unit, and (2) the court's perception
of its own role in society.
Familial integrity and stability has been a cherished ideal in the
English and American legal systems.49 Any threat to the harmoni-
ous relation between husband and wife has ramifications potentially
affecting children, property, estate, and society. The majority posi-
tion in the United States has been that allowing interspousal tort lia-
bility will be disruptive of the peace and harmony of the family
unit. ° Courts are tacitly unwilling to take action that may increase
the risk of separation, divorce, or annulment (demands on legal sys-
tem) or create dependents not supported by the traditional bread-
winner-husband (demands on the social system). A calculated
appraisal of the burdens interspousal litigation could place on soci-
ety may be a large part of the judicial reverence accorded the loving
and harmonious family unit." Add to this a strong policy of judicial
nonintervention into the private relations between husband and wife
and the grounds for judicial resistance to recognition of tort liability
between the spouses are firmly established.
How a court perceives its role-as guardian, interpreter, or
fense. Scholarly opinion maintains that the social and historical justifications for interspousal
immunity are long past. See, e.g., Farage, Recoveryfor Torts Between Spouses, 10 IND. L.J.
290, 302-03 (1934); Kahn-Freund, Inconsistencies and Injustices in the Law of Husband and
Wfe, 15 MOD. L. REV. 133, 154 (1952); McCurdy, 4 VILL. L. REV. 303, supra note 12, at 337-
38; McCurdy, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030, supra note 12, at 1054-56; Comment, New Interests in
the Law of Torts, 10 CAL. L. REV. 461, 480 (1922); Comment, Tort Liability Within the Family
Area, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 610, 618-20 (1956); Comment, Marital Disability in Personal Tort
Actions, 14 U. MIAMI L. REV. 99, 109 (1959); Note, Husband and W#/e - Interspousal Immu-
nity, 48 U. CINN. L. REV.120, 125 (1978). See also, W. PROSSER, supra note 33, at 863; RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895 F (1979).
47. Imig v. March, __ Neb. __ _ 279 NW.2d 382, 384 (1979). See generally RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895 G, at 72-78 (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972), for a listing of juris-
dictions that have abrogated the interspousal immunity doctrine.
48. See Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 542, 388 A.2d 951, 955 (1978).
49. 2 J. BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE, 640, 770 (1968).
50. See, e.g., Patterson v. Patterson, 129 N.J. Super. 524, 324 A.2d I1l, 112-13 (1974),
overruled in, Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951 (1978), in which the court stated,
[T]his court is aware of the need for a sanctuary from the pressures and tensions of
our modem world. Man must have a haven--some place where he can relax and
lower his guard; some place where he is not held to an objective standard of reasona-
bleness. It is to be hoped the reasonably prudent man will not treat his wife with the
same aloof standard of conduct he, hopefully, accords his neighbor. Sanctuary has
been one of the prime functions of the home in our society, and to require individuals
to conform to a high degree of care in the privacy of their own homes would vitiate
the reason for its existence.
51. Intentional tort and wrongful death actions have been the most frequent exceptions
to the immunity defense, precisely because judicial intervention is not perceived as promoting
personal conflict between spouses or burdening society. By not permitting these suits, however,
society may pay additional legal and social costs through divorce or criminal action, or public
support of dependents. See Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917) (intentional
tort exception); Welch v. Davis, 410 Ill. 130, 101 N.E.2d 547 (1951) (wrongful death exception).
modifier/adapter of case and statutory law-will determine its posi-
tion on interspousal tort immunity. These widely divergent func-
tional views underlie the inconsistent and contradictory holdings in
this area.52 It was the Imig court's perceived view of its role as the
responsible body for adapting law to meet the needs of modem soci-
ety that led it to completely abrogate the doctrine.53
While judicial refusal to abolish the interspousal tort immunity
doctrine has been soundly criticized,54 courts willing to overturn the
immunity defense have been met with charges of judicial usurpation
of legislative authority.55 The increasing number of courts that have
abolished the doctrine view it as having originated in the common
law, and therefore, within the ambit of judicial, rather than legisla-
tive, supervision.
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Perhaps the doctrine is best viewed as a hybrid of common-law
theory, statutory impact, and judicial interpretation. State statutes
regarding interspousal torts fall into three broad categories: (1) those
statutes with specific provisions regulating interspousal liability;57 (2)
those statutes that do not mention tort claims, but permit other types
of interspousal suits;58 and (3) statutes that prohibit interspousal
suits, but with certain limited exceptions.59
Considerations of time and character further delineate the ap-
plication of the interspousal immunity doctrine. A personal tort be-
52. Compare DiGirolamo v. Apanavage, 454 Pa. 557, 312 A.2d 382, 385 (1979), with Imig
v. March, _ Neb. _ _ 279 N.W.2d 382, 385 (1979).
53. The court emphasized this role in the following passage:
[J]udges of an earlier generation declared the immunity simply because they believed
it to be a sound instrument of judicial policy which would further the moral, social
and economic welfare of the people of the State. When judges of a later generation
firmly reach a contrary conclusion they must be ready to discharge their own judicial
responsibilities in conformance with modem concepts and needs.
Neb. at _, 279 N.W.2d at 386 (quoting Myers v. Drozda, 180 Neb. 183, 141 N.W.2d 852
(1966)).
54. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 621 (1910) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
55. A unique situation in which a state legislature responded swiftly to a state court deci-
sion abrogating the immunity defense for negligent injuries between spouses occurred in Illi-
nois in 1953. See note 29 supra.
Although the Nebraska Legislature has not been in session since Imig v. March was de-
cided, it is unlikely that the decision will spark legislative reaction. The holding may be con-
troversially broad, but the weight of public opinion and the trend toward abrogation of the
defense in other states strongly support the court's position.
56. Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 284 N.E.2d 794 (1972); Beaudette v. Frana, 285
Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969); Rupert v. Steinne, 90 Neb. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974);
Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951 (1978); Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 506
P.2d 345 (1973); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972).
57. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § I (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-5 (1976);
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW. § 3-313 (McKinney 1978); Wis. STAT. § 246.075 (1957). See also note
29 supra.
58. ARIz. R. Civ. P. § 17(e) (1979); IND. CODE § 2-204 (Supp. 1955); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-305 (1975); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.180 (Supp. 1955) (all construed as permitting some
types of interspousal tort claims).
59. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209, § 6 (West 1958); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-9 (West
1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § Il l (Purdon 1965) (statutes construed as permitting exceptions
to the general rule prohibiting husband-wife tort claims).
tween husband and wife may occur before6 ° or during6! marriage,
after legal separation,62 or during an interlocutory period between
marriage and divorce.63 The suit may be brought after marriage for
a tort committed during marriage.64 The tort may be negligent65 or
intentional, 66 resulting in injury67 or death. 68 There may be third-
party involvement.69 An insurance carrier7 ° or employer 7' may af-
fect the claim. The tort may have been the result of an automobile
collision.7 2 Whether the interspousal suit is litigated under the
60. Bohenek v. Niedzwiecki, 142 Conn. 278, 113 A.2d 509 (1955) (holding under applica-
ble Pennsylvania law that a woman who married tortfeasor subsequent to car accident lost
right to sue him for injuries arising from the accident); Amendola v. Amendola, __ Fla. Supp.
- 121 So. 2d 805 (1960) (wife's rights in tort against husband suspended during marriage);
Packenham v. Miltimore, 89 Ill. App. 2d 452, 232 N.E.2d 42 (1967) (wife entitled to action
against husband for antenuptial injuries sustained in auto accident allegedly caused by hus-
band's wanton and wilful misconduct); Moulton v. Moulton, 309 A.2d 224 (Me. 1973) (hus-
band liable for antenuptial injuries to wife).
61. Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962) (wife has cause
of action against husband for injuries sustained from fall on slippery boat deck when husband
negligently left water on the deck).
62. Arch v. Arch, 11 Md. App. 395, 274 A.2d 646 (1971) (immunity doctrine applies
during legal separation).
63. Patterson v. Patterson, 129 N.J. Super. 524, 324 A.2d 111 (1974) (immunity in effect
despite pending divorce).
64. Bums v. Bums, II Ariz. 178, 526 P.2d 717 (1974) (no cause of action after divorce
for negligent tort committed during marriage); Ebel v. Ferguson, 478 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1972)
(wife may not recover after divorce for wrongful act by husband during marriage). But see
Windauer v. O'Connor, 107 Ariz. 267, 485 P.2d 1157 (1971) (spouse may recover damages
after divorce for intentional tort committed during marriage).
65. Merenoffv. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951 (1978) (totally abrogated immunity
doctrine for all tort actions on facts relating to negligent injuries); Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass.
1619, 351 N.E.2d 526 (1976) (wife allowed recovery for auto injuries due to husband's negli-
gence; holding strictly limited to negligence in auto claims). See note 72 infra.
66. Lusby v. Lusby, _ Md. _., 390 A.2d 77 (1978) (wife recovers against husband for
outrageous and intentional personal tort of forcible sexual intercourse).
67. Id
68. See Welch v. Davis, 410 Ill. 130, 101 N.E.2d 547 (195 1); Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski,
321 Pa. 438, 184 A. 663 (1936) (both permitting wrongful death actions). But see Hovey v.
Dolmage, 203 Iowa 231, 212 N.W. 553 (1927); Wilson v. Brown, 154 S.W. 322 (Tex. Civ. App.
1913); Keister's Adm'r. v. Keister's Ex'rs., 123 Va. 157, 96 S.E. 315 (1918).
69. Ennis v. Donovan, 222 Md. 536, 161 A.2d 698 (1960) (third-party derivative action
against husband of decedent denied on grounds that husband was or might have been liable
for auto accident causing wife's death and wife would have had no cause of action against
husband had she lived). Contra, Shor v. Paoli, 353 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1977); Pelowski v. Freder-
ickson, 263 Minn. 371, 116 N.W.2d 701 (1962).
70. Harvey v. Harvey, 239 Mich. 142, _, 214 N.W. 305, 306 (1927); Perlman v. Brooklyn
City R. Co., 117 Misc. 353, 191 N.Y.S. 891 (Sup. Ct. 1921); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282
A.2d 351 (1971). See also Imig v. March, _ Neb. _., - 279 N.W.2d 382, 387 (1979).
71. In states in which the immunity defense is viable, courts generally disavow suits
against a spouse's employer based on negligence of the spouse as an ineffective attempt to
circumvent the prohibition on interspousal suits. See note 38 supra.
72. Courts are divided as to whether recovery should be allowed in interspousal claims
for auto injuries, although the trend is toward permitting recovery, particularly in cases in
which there is an insurance carrier, wrongful death, or intentional or grossly negligent conduct.
Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1939). Accord Brooks v. Robinson, 259
Ind. 16, 284 N.E.2d 794 (1972); Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 138 N.W.2d 343 (1965);
Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970); Digby v. Digby, - R.I. _ 388 A.2d 1
(1978). Contra, Huebner v. Deuchle, 109 Ariz. 549, 514 P.2d 470 (1973); Policino v. Ehrlich,
478 Pa. 5, 385 A.2d 968 (1978). See generally notes 94 and 95 and accompanying text infra.
wrongful death statute in the state, as Imig was,73 or whether minor
dependents survive the decedent74 will all be factors weighing into
the court's consideration of the acceptability of the case.
By the time Imig v. March was tried by the Nebraska Supreme
Court, several states had already abolished the defense of inter-
spousal immunity in wrongful death actions.75 What distinguishes
the Nebraska court ruling in Imig is not the novelty of the decision,
but its breadth and the process used by the court to abrogate the
doctrine after a long period of judicial inertia.
Imig v. March held that interspousal immunity was abolished in
all tort actions, a far-reaching ruling many other courts would have
avoided.76 Wrongful death actions have been recognized by many
states77 as one of the exceptions to the immunity defense. The policy
concerns of fraud and collusion between spouses and disruption of
family harmony do not exist when one spouse is deceased. 78 Rather
than treat the wrongful death claim as an exception to the inter-
spousal immunity doctrine, the Imig court used the claim as an op-
portunity for abolishing the immunity defense in all interspousal tort
cases.79 The holding is remarkable for its brevity and scope.
Courts less bold have engaged in judicial cartwheels to reconcile
the creation of a wrongful death exception while still retaining the
doctrine for other tort actions. By only abrogating immunity for
wrongful death suits, these courts permit the estate or personal repre-
sentative of the decedent to have a cause of action that would have
73. See Hull v. Silver, __ Utah __ 577 P.2d 103 (1978) (interspousal immunity doctrine
abrogated in Utah under wrongful death statute). Accord, In re Pickens, 255 Ind. 119, 263
N.E.2d 151 (1970). See note 75 and accompanying text infra.
74. Dependent minors present an equitable consideration in the court's appraisal of
plaintiffs case. In re Pickens, 255 Ind. 119, 263 N.E.2d 151 (1970).
75. Kentucky, Robinson's Adm'r v. Robinson, 188 Ky. 49, 220 S.W. 1074 (1920); Michi-
gan, Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 138 N.W.2d 343 (1965); Minnesota, Poepping v. Linde-
mann, 268 Minn. 30, 127 N.W.2d 512 (1964); Pennsylvania, Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 321
Pa. 438, 184 A. 663 (1936); and Washington, Johnson v. Ottomeier, 45 Wash. 419, 275 P.2d 723
(1954), had already recognized a wrongful death exception.
76. The lmig decision appears to be unique in its approach to abrogation of the inter-
spousal immunity doctrine. No other case has been found that completely strikes down the
defense for all tort claims on the basis of a wrongful death action before the court.
77. See, e.g., Welch v. Davis, 410 Ill. 130, 101 N.E.2d 547 (1951); Herget Nat'l Bank of
Pekin v. Berardi, 31 Ill. App. 3d 689, 335 N.E.2d 39 (1975); Deposit Guar. Bank & Trust v.
Nelson, 212 Miss. 535, 54 So. 2d 476 (1951).
78. Johnson v. People's First Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co., 394 Pa. 116, 112, 145 A.2d 716,
719 (1958); Johnson v. Ottomeier, 45 Wash. 2d 419, 424, 275 P.2d 723, 725 (1954).
79. Compare the cautious approach of the Indiana Supreme Court in Brooks v. Robin-
son, 259 Ind. 16, _ 284 N.E.2d 794, 798 (1972), which preserved the immunity doctrine, but
"subject to amendment, modification or abrogation by this court." Note also the piecemeal
approach of the Washington Supreme Court in abrogating interspousal tort immunity: Schultz
v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 118 P. 629 (1911) (judicially established the doctrine in the
state); Johnson v. Ottomeier, 45 Wash. 2d 419, 275 P.2d 723 (1954) (wrongful death exception
to general rule); Goode v. Martinis, 58 Wash. 2d 229, 361 P.2d 941 (1961) (intentional tort
committed during legal separation another exception to rule); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d
183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972) (negligent tort actionable in interspousal suit).
been denied had the decedent survived."s To skirt this obvious in-
consistency, other courts have described the immunity as purely per-
sonal and, therefore, terminating at the spouse's death. 8' This
proposition enables the personal representative to maintain an ac-
tion in his own right, somehow emanating from the person of the
decedent, in fact a new action.82 Other courts have described the
wrongful death action as enunciated in the statutes as a drivative
action based on the right of the decedent to maintain a cause of ac-
tion had death not ensued. 3 To avoid the problem that decedent-
spouse could not have brought a suit in life, the court will then inter-
pret "derivative" to mean derived from the injury causing death, not
derived from the person of the decedent.8 4
The Imig court dispenses with this legal hocus-pocus and forth-
rightly declares interspousal tort immunity to be completely abro-
gated and, therefore, a wrongful death action cannot be barred by
the immunity defense.85 Imig v. March provides sound reasoning in
an area fraught with judicial inconsistency, blind rationalization,
and a propensity to disguise policy predispositions in statutory inter-
pretation.86 Renouncing the rationale for maintaining the inter-
spousal tort immunity doctrine, the court, quoting Professor Prosser,
asserted that interspousal suits are a symptom and not a cause of
family disharmony.87
The chief reason relied upon by all these courts is that personal
tort actions between husband and wife would disrupt and destroy
the peace and harmony of the home, which is against the policy of
the law. This is on the bald theory that after a husband has beaten
his wife, there is a state of peace and harmony left to be disturbed;
and that if she is sufficiently injured or angry to sue him for it, she
will be soothed and deterred from reprisals by denying her the
legal remedy-and this even though she has left him or divorced
him for that very ground, and although the same courts refuse to
find any disruption of domestic tranquility if she sues him for a
tort to her property, or brings a criminal prosecution against him.
If this reasoning appeals to the reader, let him by all means adopt
it.
8 8
80. "A tortfeasor should not be under two different measures of obligation-one to the
injured party and another to the heirs." Hull v. Silver, __ Utah, _, _, 577 P.2d 103, 107
(1978).
81. Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 562, 138 N.W.2d 343, 353 (1965).
82. Id. at 353, 138 N.W.2d at __ Hull v. Silver, _ Utah __ 577 P.2d 103, 105, 106
(1978).
83. Welch v. Davis, 410 Ii. 130, _ 101 N.E.2d 547, 548 (1951). Contra, Huebner v.
Deuchle, 109 Ariz. 549, 514 P.2d 470 (1973) (denied a right of action in wrongful death by
spouse's representative precisely on the grounds that it was a derivative action and thus, barred
under the immunity doctrine).
84. Welch v. Davis, 410 Ill. 130, 135, 101 N.E.2d 547, 549 (1951); In re Pickens, 255 Ind.
119,_ 263 N.E.2d 151, 156 (1970).
85. Imig v. March, __ Neb. __ .. _, 279 N.W.2d 382, 386 (1979).
86. W. PROSSER, supra note 33, at 863.
87. Imig v. March, _ Neb. _., _, 279 N.W.2d 382, 385 (1979).
88. id. at _, 279 N.W.2d at 384-85 (quoting W. PROSSER, supra note 33, at 863).
The court also rejected the traditional arguments based on concerns
of fraudulent claims arising out of interspousal litigation and the
availability of other remedies, which render tort claims between hus-
band and wife unnecessary. 89 Instead, the court emphasized the re-
sponsibility of the judicial system to be open to injured parties
seeking redress. The court asserted that the basic injustice of the
interspousal immunity doctrine is that it renders a deserving plaintiff
remediless while permitting a guilty defendant to escape punish-
ment.9" Like other forms of immunity, unless there is compelling
justification, it offends the belief that a legal system should be open
to all for the redress of grievances.
At the end of the 1970's, liability for interspousal tort is on the
brink of becoming the majority rule in the United States.9 ' Still,
"[t]hese suits are now rejected in approximately one-half of the
states."92 Courts willing to partially abrogate the doctrine find it
most indefensible in intentional torts,93 wrongful death actions,94
and auto claims. 95 The availability of insurance coverage is also an
89. Criminal and divorce actions are often cited as providing adequate remedy for the
aggrieved spouse. Neither of these actions, however, is well-suited to providing damages for
injury. Another difficulty is that negligent injury is not grounds for either action, and a wrong-
ful death action would be precluded if criminal charges or divorce were the only available
remedies. Allowing tort claims between spouses could potentially avert the need for a more
drastic solution in the divorce or criminal courts.
90. The court analogized the injustice of interspousal tort immunity to the inequities of
the governmental and charitable immunity doctrines, both of which had been earlier abro-
gated by the court. Id. at _, 279 N.W.2d at 385-86.
91. The trend toward abrogation of the defense has proceeded steadily in the twentieth
century in spite of inconsistent and widely conflicting holdings from state to state. The earliest
states to strike down the immunity and permit interspousal tort litigation were: Alabama
(Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917)); Arkansas (Fitzpatrick v. Owens, 124 Ark.
167, 186 S.W. 832 (1916)); Connecticut (Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889 (1914)); and
Oklahoma (Fiedeer v. Fiedeer, 42 Okla. 124, 140 P. 1022 (1914)). The list of jurisdictions to
have abrogated the immunity doctrine for some or all interspousal torts is still growing. See
note 47 and accompanying text supra for sources of jurisdictional listings.
92. Imig v. March, _ Neb. __, _ 279 N.W.2d 382, 384 (1979). For examples of the
outrageous results possible by denying a cause of action on the grounds of interspousal immu-
nity, see Wright v. Daniels, 164 N.W.2d 180 (Iowa 1969) (wife's estate denied recovery from
husband convicted of wife's death); Miles v. West, 224 Kan. 284, 580 P.2d 876 (1978) (damages
awarded wife and minor children for auto collision reduced by percentage of fault attributable
to husband as joint-tortfeasor); Donsbach v. Offield, 488 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972)
(reversal of damage award to children of mother shot to death by her second husband).
93. Lusby v. Lusby, _ Md. __ 390 A.2d 77 (1978); Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 600, 506
P.2d 345 (1973).
94. See notes 76-85 and accompanying text supra.
95. In a day when automobile accidents are unfortunately becoming so frequent and
the injuries suffered by the passengers are often so severe, it seems unjust to deny the
claims of the many because of the potentiality of fraud by the few. Moreover, there is
something wanting in a system of justice which permits strangers, friends, relatives,
and emancipated children to recover for injuries suffered as a result of their driver's
negligence, but denies this right to the driver's spouse and minor children who are
also passengers in the same vehicle.
Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, _ 267 A.2d 481, 488 (1970). Accord, Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev.
397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938); Digby v.
Digby, _ R.I. _, 388 A.2d 1 (1978). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F,
Comment f, at 425-26 (1979).
important factor promoting the trend toward court acceptance of
husband-wife tort suits.96
While an increasing number of states recognize that inter-
spousal tort immunity is little more than a relic of a bygone era, the
doctrine is still rigidly upheld in many jurisdictions, and injured par-
ties are denied an appropriate remedy.97 The Supreme Court of Ne-
braska, and other courts have taken a realistic view of contemporary
needs98 when refusing to condone the continued existence of a judi-
cial procedure that makes the marital relation an obstacle to the or-
derly resolution of conflict. Imig v. March is a bold and positive
thrust toward expanding individual rights and responsibilities, and
in renewing the effectiveness and integrity of the court system.
Courts in other states would do well to follow the example.
96. The court in Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970) declared:
Domestic harmony may be more threatened by denying a cause of action than by
permitting one where there is insurance coverage. The cost of making the injured
spouse whole would necessarily come out of the family coffers, yet a tortfeasor spouse
surely anticipates that he will be covered in the event that his negligence causes his
spouse injuries. This unexpected drain on the family's financial resources could
likely lead to an interference with the normal family life. And it is doubtful that this
void in insurance coverage would comport with the reasonable expectations of the
insured that this Court has so often sought to protect.
Id. at 489, 267 A.2d at 485.
97. See note 92 supra.
98. Some recent holdings, however, do not necessarily reflect progressive judicial think-
ing. Compare Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889 (1914), with Patterson v. Patterson, 129
N.J. Super. 524, 324 A.2d 111 (1974), overruled by, Merenoffv. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d
951 (1978). [Casenote by Carol F. Munson]
